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Metaphysical concerns occupy a central place in Ludwig Landgrebe’s thought.  1
To a large extent, it is a contribution to metaphysics that he read and appropriated 
Husserl’s work. Already in 1933’s “The method of Edmund Husserl’s 
phenomenology,” one of his very first publications, he claims that the most 
central aim of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology is to pave the route for a 
“universal philosophical science.”  Later, Landgrebe conceived the project of a 2
metaphysics of his own, based on Husserl’s method of phenomenological 
reduction. This project as well as his metaphysical reading of Husserl seem 
paradoxical, because the term “phenomenological reduction” usually denotes 
some sort of emancipation from metaphysics.  The present paper aims to outline 3
some aspects of Landgrebe’s phenomenological metaphysics and thereby to 
explain why, in his view, this paradox is only apparent. 
Landgrebe’s phenomenological metaphysics is deeply Husserlian. 
However, like virtually all of Husserl’s followers, Landgrebe sharply criticizes 
transcendental idealism and argues instead for a strong metaphysical realism. 
Roughly, we could say that Landgrebe provides a phenomenological version of 
the Russell-Moore argument for realism. Russell and Moore claim that realism is 
better because it aligns with our ordinary beliefs about the world and these beliefs 
should be presumed true unless shown otherwise. Landgrebe holds that realism is 
better because it accords with how we actually experience the world. Thus, 
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Landgrebe’s metaphysical realism and his critique of modern antirealism involve 
a certain view of experience. In what follows, I will discuss a thought-provoking 
idea that is at the heart of his metaphysical enterprise as a whole. This idea is that 
immediate experience presents us not only with physical bodies or sensory 
qualities such as noises, colors and shapes, but also with subjects endowed with 
an intentional life. Echoing similar themes in Levinas and Buber, Landgrebe 
terms this experience the “evidence of the You” (Evidenz des Du). 
A “New Beginning” 
Landgrebe regarded the task of laying the foundations for a phenomenologically-
based metaphysics as a crucial task for the philosophers of his time—a crucial 
task dictated by the historical situation of philosophy and mankind. 
Landgrebe’s initial diagnosis runs as follows. First, metaphysics has 
broken down due to Descartes’s Ego Cogito and his misconception of 
metaphysics as a mathesis universalis.  Until Descartes, metaphysics was a “life 4
stance” (Lebenshaltung)—a “theory” in the Greek sense of the word.  5
Metaphysics sought to disclose the fundamental relation between humanity and 
the world as a whole. Descartes lost this original understanding of metaphysics 
by construing beings as objects of knowledge and, consequently, metaphysics 
merely as a form of knowledge. In Landgrebe’s view, there was a momentary 
rebirth of metaphysics in the early 19th century with the German idealists.  6
Immediately after them, the arrival of positivists and Young Hegelians put a 
temporary end to the history of metaphysics.  7
This fundamental relationship to the world dealt with in the pre-Cartesian 
and post-Kantian metaphysics constitutes man’s essence or soil (Boden). 
Accordingly, the end of metaphysics in modern times is not merely a chapter in 
the history of philosophy or culture. As Landgrebe says, “the breakdown of 
metaphysics has ultimately led to the breakdown of the human essence.”  8
Therefore, it is the philosopher’s historical task to recover man’s essence by 
restoring metaphysics in its original dimension. This task requires laying a “new 
foundation for metaphysics” (Neubegründung der Metaphysik)  and thus 9
 Ludwig Landgrebe, Phänomenologie und Metaphysik, 155–156; Ludwig Landgrebe, 4
“Phenomenology and Metaphysics,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 10/2 (1949): 
201.
 Ludwig Landgrebe, Phänomenologie und Metaphysik, 154; Ludwig Landgrebe, “Phenomenology 5
and Metaphysics,” 200. 
 Ludwig Landgrebe, Phänomenologie und Metaphysik, 156.6
 Ludwig Landgrebe, “Phenomenology and Metaphysics,” 198, 201. Ludwig Landgrebe, Faktizität 7
und Individuation: Studien zu den Grundfragen der Phänomenologie (Hamburg: Meiner, 1982), 
11ff.
 Ludwig Landgrebe, “Phenomenology and Metaphysics,” 158.8
 Ludwig Landgrebe, Phänomenologie und Metaphysik, 9, 157. 9
	2
initiating a “new beginning” (neuer Anfang) for German philosophy.  10
In Landgrebe’s view, Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology 
constitutes such a new foundation for metaphysics, insofar as its aim is to clarify 
man’s fundamental relation to the world as a whole: 
If we understand that the end of metaphysics in the 19th century is not only 
an event in the history of philosophy, but a symptom of the absence of soil 
(Bodenloswerden) of modern life in general, and if we realize that 
phenomenology means a return to the soil which the Occident bore in 
itself, then the apparently extravagant claim of Husserl’s phenomenology 
in its later phase becomes understandable: not to be only a renewal of the 
foundations of the sciences and philosophy, but a tool for a renewal of life 
as a whole.  11
This diagnosis is very similar to that of Husserl in the Crisis. For Husserl as well, 
the cause of the crisis of European mankind is the rise of the objective sciences in 
modern times, which brought metaphysics to its end. For Husserl as well as for 
Landgrebe, only transcendental phenomenology—which the former calls a 
“metaphysics” in several texts of the 1920s and 1930s—enables us to overcome 
that crisis.  Nevertheless, for some reasons I will discuss below, Landgrebe did 12
not consider that Husserl had successfully carried out the task of restoring 
metaphysics. The phenomenological metaphysics Landgrebe had in view is better 
seen as a potentiality of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology.  13
Metaphysics, Phenomenology 
To understand Landgrebe’s idea of a phenomenological metaphysics, we need to 
know what he means by “metaphysics” and “phenomenology.” 
Let us begin with metaphysics. Landgrebe defines metaphysics from two 
distinct perspectives. The first is anthropological, and the second is more 
ontological.  From the point of view of man, as we have seen, the 14
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metaphysician’s job is to clarify our lost link to the world—to uncover our 
original relationship to the whole of being. This must be the starting point of any 
metaphysics according to Landgrebe. However, man’s being-in-the-world is 
“neither the only nor the ultimate object” of metaphysics.  From the point of 15
view of being, Landgrebe claims, metaphysics investigates the world itself, or 
more precisely what he calls “the absolute,” namely the objective or transcendent 
world. This absolute is that which reveals itself in knowledge. An object of 
knowledge is expected to transcend individual, subjective experience. 
In other words, the object of metaphysics is transcendence in two distinct 
senses. First, “transcendence” means, as in Heidegger, man’s relation to being in 
the most general sense—a relation which Landgrebe, unlike Heidegger, identifies 
with Husserl’s intentionality. Second, “transcendence” is to be understood in the 
sense of that which transcends man and to which man stands in a relation of 
transcendence in the former sense. Transcendence is the object of metaphysics in 
both senses. 
Likewise, metaphysics is “transcendental” in two distinct senses.  First, 16
it is transcendental inasmuch as it has to do with the conditions of possibility of 
our knowledge of the world. Second, it is transcendental in the medieval sense in 
which “transcendentalia” were the basic features that constitute the character of 
being of all beings.  17
To sum up: metaphysics is an inquiry into transcendence, that is, into 
both the transcendent world and humanity’s stance to it. In his 1947 lecture 
entitled Was bedeutet uns heute Philosophie?, Landgrebe presents this twofold 
characterization as a definition not of metaphysics, but of philosophy in general. 
In this text, he takes seriously Heidegger’s view that the end of metaphysics—as 
a unitary thought of being—has resulted in an endless conflict of worldviews 
(Weltanschauungen). Worldviews, as he conceives them, are opposed to 
philosophy. They are not sets of beliefs, but provide a “basis” (Boden) for beliefs. 
By contrast with philosophy, which is always uncertain, a worldview provides a 
basis that is characterized by its firmness and fixity.  18
Let us now turn to phenomenology. Landgrebe defines phenomenology 
as a method for the analysis of consciousness—a method whose most central 
aspect is the phenomenological reduction.  This definition is in explicit 19
opposition to the realist phenomenologists’ understanding of phenomenology as a 
 Ludwig Landgrebe, Phänomenologie und Metaphysik, 157.15
 Ibid., 158.16
 Similarly, Heidegger explains in Being and Time that he uses “transcendental” in reference to 17
both Dasein’s “outstanding transcendence” (ausgezeichnete Transzendenz) and being taken as the 
“transcendens pure and simple.” See Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 
1967), 38; Being and Time, trans. J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson (Oxford: Blackwell, 1962), 62.
 Ludwig Landgrebe, Was bedeutet uns heute Philosophie? (Hamburg: Marion von Schröder, 18
1954), 44ff.
 Ludwig Landgrebe, Phänomenologie und Metaphysik, 149.19
	4
theory of essences. It would be incorrect to view Landgrebe’s attempt to build up 
a phenomenological metaphysics as a continuation of the essentialist, Platonic 
metaphysics promoted by the Munich Circle. The reason why Landgrebe thinks it 
necessary to elaborate a phenomenological metaphysics is his conviction that 
only the phenomenological reduction—not the intuition of essences—will allow 
the metaphysician to tackle and accomplish the task outlined above: 
The problem of what a phenomenological metaphysics should look like 
can only be suitably posed if phenomenology is taken not merely in the 
popular and vague sense of an intuition of essences (Wesenserschauung), 
but as a method for the analysis of consciousness on the basis of the 
phenomenological reduction—this most intimate core (innerster Kern) of 
phenomenology.  20
Landgrebe’s Argument 
In Landgrebe’s view, a phenomenological metaphysics is a metaphysics that uses 
the phenomenological method, and this phenomenological method centrally 
involves operating the phenomenological reduction. This, however, raises a 
crucial problem, for the reduction is usually seen as a reduction to the Ego 
Cogito; that is, to subjective immanence.  How could the phenomenological 21
reduction, as a reduction to immanence, be of help for a metaphysics that is 
defined as a thought of transcendence? “How, asks Landgrebe, can a metaphysics 
that has ‘the reduction to the Ego Cogito’ as its starting point (…) lead to a 
knowledge that constitutes man’s link to the transcendence?”  The idea of a 22
phenomenological metaphysics seems to make no sense. 
While this concern led most of Husserl’s followers to distance 
themselves from the transcendental idealism of Ideas I, Landgrebe attempted to 
engage with it in a way that is fully in line with Husserl’s transcendental 
phenomenology. His starting point is the view that the objectivity or 
transcendence of the world has to do with intersubjectivity: “The world is 
objective inasmuch as it is intersubjective.”  The objective world is, by 23
necessity, something that is shared in common by at least two individuals 
including myself. The reason for this is that, as Landgrebe says, “there is a 
correlation between thinking a being and thinking a subject for which this being 
is a being.”  The world is said to be “objective” insofar as it contains an endless 24
variety of things I have never seen and has a past that extends far before my birth. 
But on the other hand, every object of the world, whatever it is and however long 
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ago it existed in the past, must be the correlate of a possible consciousness that 
has it as its object. Therefore, objectivity entails intersubjectivity. The plurality of 
subjects draws what Landgrebe calls a “community horizon” (gemeinschaftlicher 
Horizont)—a horizon without which an objective world would be inconceivable. 
This, we could say, is a conceptual constraint regarding the use of the words 
“objective” and “transcendent.”  25
However, this means only that accepting the existence of an objective 
world involves accepting the existence of more than one ego. In other words, 
metaphysical realism presupposes the existence of more than one ego. This does 
not rule out the possibility that the transcendent world is no more than an illusion 
and hence that realism is false. It can be that I think there is an objective world 
but that actually there is only one ego, namely myself. In that case, Landgrebe’s 
metaphysics would not really be a phenomenological metaphysics, but rather a 
phenomenology of metaphysics, that is, a theory whose subject matter is not the 
objective world’s existence as such, but its appearing to me as existent. Husserl 
himself goes no further than this. The metaphysical neutrality of his 
transcendental phenomenology simply means that it implies neither realism nor 
anti-realism—and that it is compatible with both. As a matter of fact, the only 
existence thesis endorsed by the transcendental phenomenologist is the pure “I 
am” of the Cartesian way of reduction. 
Landgrebe, by contrast, believes that the Cartesian reduction is only a 
first step and that the phenomenological reduction needs to be pushed further.  26
In a sense, he argues, the ego uncovered by Husserl’s phenomenological 
reduction is limited to being a solus ipse, the Residuum der Weltvernichtung. But 
on another hand, the reduction reveals that this ego is essentially intentional and 
that it is in its nature to have a world. That is why the reduction can be a first step 
towards a metaphysics conceived of as a theory of transcendence: 
Only in the radicalism of this return the subjectivity is revealed in its 
essence, which is to be understood as intentionality (…). ‘Thereby the 
subjectivity’ can discover this: it is not so poor that nothing remains to it 
but the logical reasoning from the isolated ego to its “object”; rather, it has 
in itself all that is necessary to get out of this lowest point and start again: 
gaining the world requires having lost the world. 	27
Thus far, Landgrebe’s line of argument is strictly Husserlian. The idea underlying 
Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology is that the reduction makes us lose the 
world we posit as mind-independently existent in the natural attitude, but leaves 
unchanged the world conceived as a pure appearance or “noema,” that is, as 
something that appears as existent in the natural attitude. However, Landgrebe in 
fact makes a much stronger claim, advocating a metaphysical realism that 





explicitly denies that phenomenology is metaphysically neutral: “The 
phenomenological analytics is not a neutral method that can then be overcome by 
any metaphysical position.”  Landgrebe offers an interesting argument for this 28
claim. This argument can be reconstructed as follows: 
First, Landgrebe regards it as nonsense to seek to demonstrate the 
existence of the objective world. It is nonsense precisely because it is nonsense to 
conceive of the subject as a solus ipse, a sphere of subjective immanence the 
metaphysician has to get out of. Actually, we as phenomenologists do have the 
right to accept as existent not only a world, but the objective world—a world that 
we share in common with other egos. We are warranted in doing so just because 
this is what we experience. 
What is the phenomenologist as such licensed to posit as existent? In 
order to answer this question, we need a criterion. Such a criterion has been 
provided by Husserl in his Ideas I. The so-called “principle of all principles” 
states that we have the right to posit something as existent only if we have an 
intuition of it. This is what Landgrebe calls the “intuitionistic fundamental 
principle of phenomenology.”  But of what do we have such an intuition? What 29
is actually given in our perceptual experiences at the most basic level? A natural 
answer is that what the subject primarily experiences is a set of inert objects, 
devoid of any intentional life, i.e., physical things or sensory qualities such as 
colors and shapes. The only subject she directly experiences is herself. She 
primarily experiences no other intentional subject, but she presumes, by analogy 
with herself, that some of its objects also have a world and that this world is one 
and the same with hers. It follows from this that transcendence is only a 
secondary construction. Since intersubjectivity is a necessary condition for 
objectivity, it is only on the basis of such an analogical construction that she can 
constitute an objective world. Therefore, the world she primarily experiences is 
not objective; it is as relative, subjective, mind-dependent as a dream. The only 
absolute being that is given to her at the most basic level is her own sphere of 
immanence. 
Landgrebe strongly rejects this line of reasoning as flawed and 
misleading, arguing that the atomic account of sensory experience it rests upon is 
incorrect. On this account, the primary data of experience are individual elements 
that the subject secondarily associates and interprets. For example, a seen human 
face is primarily a set of individual sensory qualities, namely colors and shapes, 
and this set of qualities is secondarily grasped as the face of a person who has 
intentional states such as beliefs and feelings. As Landgrebe emphasizes, Gestalt 
theory and developmental psychology show that this account of experience is 
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totally false.  What we are actually given in experience are not individual 30
elements, but a “total impression” (Totaleindruck).  When you see a human face, 31
you primarily see a face with feelings—a face that is immediately demarcated 
and identified as the face of a person with an intentional life. Psychologists have 
shown that newborns as well as nonhuman animals already see faces as 
expressing feelings, for example as a friendly or angry face. A dog reacts quite 
differently depending on how you look at it. This is how we actually experience 
the world at the most basic level: “The early forms of the images of the world,” 
Landgrebe argues, “grasp the whole domain of being not only as lived, but also 
as expressing life and will.”  32
Landgrebe terms the experience of others thus conceived “the evidence 
of the You” (die Evidenz des Du) and considers it a component of our most 
immediate experience of the world. As he insists, this evidence is not merely a 
higher order feeling or thought that is superadded to experience. Rather, it must 
intrinsically determine the original data of experience. 
Concluding Remarks 
Although Landgrebe’s jargon bears a strong whiff of post-Kantianism, his 
phenomenological metaphysics should not be regarded merely as a relic of old-
fashioned German metaphysics. In my estimation, Landgrebe’s 
phenomenological line of argument in favor of metaphysical realism offers an 
important contribution to the realism debate as posed in his time. First and 
foremost, it has the merit of addressing the issue of the nature and starting point 
of metaphysics on a substantially new basis. As Debabrata Sinha has rightly 
pointed out, Landgrebe’s phenomenological metaphysics is more of a 
“descriptive” than a “revisionary” metaphysics.  Its aim is not to lay down a 33
firm foundation for knowledge by grounding it in a more robust ontological 
framework, but rather to elucidate “the question of the meaning of Being, of what 
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we really mean when we say ‘Something is’ and ‘It is this or that’.”  This may 34
be a way to make sense of Landgrebe’s claim that to answer metaphysical 
questions, we have to investigate what experience is at the most basic level. 
Metaphysics deals with the world as it is given in experience, and the 
world is experienced as a public world shared in common by a plurality of egos. 
Just as there is no such thing in experience as a purely immanent ego that can be 
separated out from the objective world, the idea of a world composed of 
“objects” isolated from us as “subjects” is (as we could say) an abstraction. Our 
most original contact with the world does not confront us with a jumble of 
lifeless physical phenomena that need to be further elaborated in order for them 
to form a human world. Our original world is a world imbued of meanings and 
values (Landgrebe doesn’t use the term, but Gestalt-theorists do)—a world 
inhabited by moms and daddies, familiar and unfamiliar, angry and friendly eyes, 
starving predators that want to devour us, and fellow beings that want us to 
comfort, hug, or kiss them. 
The world appears to me as a transcendent world. This is just how it is 
given in experience. Do we need more to embrace metaphysical realism? 
Landgrebe’s answer is “no.” There are several ways to understand this. One is to 
focus on the claim that metaphysics is as much concerned with being as with 
man’s relation to being and “the functional dependence of what we call ‘our 
world’ on subjectivity.”  Thus conceived, the metaphysical elucidation of 35
“transcendence” requires no more than experience just because transcendence 
itself is no more than our experience of being. As Landgrebe says, following 
Nietzsche, there is nothing behind it. This is the deepest reason why, for 
Landgrebe, the phenomenological reduction not only does not conflict with 
metaphysics, but is the royal road to it: 
How far, then, is phenomenology a metaphysics in the sense of a cognition 
of Being itself, of the absolute as the origin? In the first place, by cutting 
short, as a method of reduction, any rash answer to the question, τί τὸ ὄν? 
— by prohibiting any answer by which a part of the world, be it matter or 
mind, is hypostasized as the ultimate principle. But underlying this 
negative result there is something positive — the knowledge that the 
absolute which we are seeking, is none other than which at any given time, 
by constructing a world in the performances of consciousness, is revealed 
to itself; that there is “nothing behind it” (also in the sense of “nothing to 
it”).  36
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